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Existing wealth estimates show that in most countries 
intangible capital is the largest share of total wealth. 
Intangible capital is calculated as the difference between 
total wealth and tangible (produced and natural) capital. 
This paper uses new estimates of total wealth, natural 
capital, and physical capital for a panel of countries to 
shed light on the constituents of the intangible capital 
residual.  In a development-accounting framework, 
the authors show that factors of production are very 
This paper—a product of the Environment and Energy Team, Development Research Group—is part of a larger effort 
in the department to  extend the national accounts to include more comprehensive measures of the wealth of nations. 
Policy Research Working Papers are also posted on the Web at http://econ.worldbank.org. The author may be contacted 
at khamilton@worldbank.org.  
successful in explaining the variation in output per 
worker when they use intangible capital instead of 
human capital as a factor of production. This suggests 
that intangible capital captures a broad range of assets 
typically included in the total factor productivity residual.   
Human capital is an important factor, both in statistical 
and economic terms, in regressions decomposing 
intangible capital.  
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Comprehensive Wealth, Intangible Capital, and Development 
 
1. Introduction 
It has been understood since at least the time of Irving Fisher (Fisher 1906) that income is the 
return on wealth. But if we scale this idea up to the level of the national economy, we arrive at a 
puzzle. If we measure wealth only as produced capital, we see from the national balance sheet 
accounts of countries such as Canada that wealth is only a small multiple of gross national 
income, implying unrealistically high rates of return on wealth.  
 
Table 1 shows Canadian figures for 2009. The value of produced capital is less than three times 
GNI, while net worth (the sum of produced capital, commercial land and net financial assets) is a 
bit less than four times GNI – the implicit rates of return on wealth are correspondingly high, 
35.9% and 25.4%, respectively. Canadians appear to be very productive. 
 
The ‘solution’ to this puzzle, of course, is that the national balance sheets of the system of 
national accounts (SNA) exclude many intangible
1 asset values, such as human capital and the 
value of social / institutional capital. Moreover, the Canadian balance sheets highlighted in Table 
1 exclude the value of commercial natural resources.
2 Since a ‘normal’ rate of return on assets 
should be on the order of 5%, a comprehensive measure of national wealth should be on the 
order of 20 times national income. 
 
Hamilton and Hartwick (2005) show how to estimate a comprehensive measure of national 
wealth for a competitive economy with constant returns to scale. For production  ) , , ( R L K F F   
with production factors K (produced capital), labor L, natural resource flow R, and interest rate r 
(equal to the marginal product of capital), comprehensive wealth is given by 
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That is, comprehensive wealth can be measured either by adding up asset values K, H (human 
capital) and S (natural resource stock)
3 or by measuring the present value of consumption C 
along the competitive development path. The intuition behind expression (1) is that in the long 
run a country must consume within its possibilities, which are given by the sum of all its assets.  
                                                            
1 The SNA has precise definitions for intangible fixed and intangible non-produced assets, which include items such 
as mineral exploration expenditures and the value of patents. In this paper we use the term ‘intangible’ to include all 
non-physical, non-financial assets.  
2 While SNA 1993 (United Nations 1993) requires the inclusion of the value of commercial natural resources in the 
balance sheet accounts, to date only Australia has published such accounts. 
3 Note that L and R are flows of inputs, measured in worker-hours or barrels of oil, whereas H and S are asset values 
measured in dollars. 3 
 
It is then possible to derive the following result from Hamilton and Hartwick (2005): if interest 
rate r is constant,  is the depreciation rate for produced capital, and  R FR  is the value of resource 
depletion, then net income is just equal to the return on total wealth, i.e. 
 
ds e s C r rW R F K K C
t s r
t R
) ( ) (
  
         .   (2)   
 
Given the difficulty in obtaining monetary estimates for intangible assets, in this paper we 
compute intangible capital (IC) as a residual by subtracting the values of produced capital, 
natural capital and net financial assets from the value of comprehensive wealth. Our estimates of 
comprehensive wealth are calculated according to the RHS of (1) as the present discounted value 
of future consumption. Human capital is therefore implicitly included in the intangible capital 
residual along with institutional, social capital and other missing asset values, e.g. diamonds and 
fisheries, for which data are not widely available.  
 
For most of the countries in our sample, IC is the biggest contributor to total wealth; it 
represents, on average, more than 60 percent of comprehensive wealth. The finding of a large 
intangible capital residual is reminiscent of the finding in the development accounting literature 
of large cross-country differences in total factor productivity (TFP), after controlling for physical 
and human capital (see e.g. Klenow and Rodriguez Clare, 1997; Hall and Jones, 1999).  The 
conventional wisdom is that "more than half of the variation in income per capita results from 
differences in TFP. And the same applies to differences in growth rates of income per capita: 
more than half of the variation results from differences in TFP growth. Students of economic 
growth have concluded from this evidence that, in order to understand the growth of nations, it is 
necessary to develop a better understanding of the forces that shape total factor productivity" 
(Helpman, 2004, p34).  
In Section 3, we bridge the growth/development accounting literatures and the wealth accounting 
literature. First, in the tradition of the development accounting literature, we show that 
differences in physical capital, natural capital, and human capital per worker explain only 
between 20 and 43 percent of the variation in output per worker in our sample. However, if we 
use intangible capital instead of human capital, variation in factors of production explains 97 
percent of the variation in output per worker.  This is precisely what we would expect if 
intangible capital is indeed measuring a wide range of assets (human, social, institutional, etc.). 
The contribution of TFP to explaining the variation of output per worker should be small - zero 
in the limit. This result confirms what we know from the definition of intangible capital: it 
encompasses not only human capital but any other assets, such as institutional or social capital, 
which constitute the residual left when produced and natural capital are subtracted from total 
wealth.  Second, in the tradition of the growth accounting literature, we estimate a production 
function from which the shares of produced, natural and intangible capital in production can be 
derived. Although both these approaches shed light on the contribution of intangible capital to 4 
 
explaining output per worker, they do not directly address the question of what constitutes 
intangible capital. 
In Section 4, we directly investigate the composition of intangible capital, by analyzing the 
relative contributions of human capital and institutional/social capital using regression analysis. 
As in World Bank (2006), potential correlation between the regressors and the error term 
(arising, for example, from measurement error or omitted variable bias) is an issue in the 
empirical estimation. The intangible capital residual includes, by construction, (i) any assets not 
accounted for in the tangible capital estimates, for example, some minerals (e.g. diamonds, 
platinum), fisheries and groundwater, not accounted for in the calculation of natural capital, and 
(ii) any errors in the estimation of tangible capital and/or of total wealth.  
Unlike World Bank (2006), we have a panel dataset with observations for 115 countries for the 
years 1995, 2000 and 2005. The use of country and time fixed effects helps us to mitigate 
omitted variables bias as long as the unobserved variables are constant over time and/or across 
countries. In addition, we take a number of steps to reduce measurement error in the variables 
used in the analysis. Our indicator of intangible wealth accounts for net foreign financial assets; 
we use several indicators of human capital that are a function of health status in addition to years 
of schooling; we analyze the robustness of the results to alternative measures of institutional 
capital and to the exclusion of outliers.  Finally, we estimate an instrumental variables regression 
in which differences in European settler mortality rates (from Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson, 
2001), distance from the equator, and the percentage of the population speaking a Western 
European language as their first language today (from Hall and Jones, 1999), are used as 
instruments for current institutions and human capital. Overall, our results show that human 
capital is an important factor, in both statistical and economic terms, in explaining intangible 
capital.   
2. Data   
2.1 Intangible capital 
We compute intangible capital for over 100 countries for the years 1995, 2000 and 2005 by 
subtracting produced capital, natural capital and net foreign financial assets from total 
(comprehensive) wealth. Our estimates of comprehensive wealth and its "tangible" components 
are from World Bank (forthcoming). 
Applying expression (1), World Bank (forthcoming) calculates comprehensive wealth as the 
present discounted value of future consumption.
4 To test whether these comprehensive wealth 
                                                            
4 The computation is performed for a time horizon of  25 years,  which roughly corresponds to a generation. 
Assuming that the elasticity of utility with respect to consumption is one and that consumption grows at a constant 5 
 
estimates make sense, we use data from World Bank (2010) to calculate net income, and then 
apply expression (2) in order to derive the implicit rate of return on comprehensive wealth in 
each country. The distribution of rates of return is plotted in Figure 1, which shows that 80% of 
the rates lie between 4% and 6%. 
Produced capital stocks are derived from historical investment data using a perpetual inventory 
model. Most natural resources are valued by taking the present value of resource rents—the 
economic profit on exploitation—over their assumed lifetime. Resources considered include 
energy, mineral, timber and non-timber forest resources, cropland, pastureland and protected 
areas.  
Finally, the wealth estimates in World Bank (forthcoming) account for ownership of capital. The 
interest payments derived from foreign financial assets or obligations will affect future levels of 
consumption of the country's residents and, by construction, total wealth. The adjustment to the 
wealth estimates to account for ownership is particularly important in the light of the acceleration 
in cross border asset trade observed in the last decades.
5  
By definition intangible capital includes any asset other than physical capital, natural resources 
and net foreign assets.  It thus includes human capital—the sum of knowledge, skills, and know-
how possessed by the population.  It includes the institutional and social infrastructure of the 
country. It also includes resources omitted in the natural capital calculations such as subsoil 
water, diamonds, and fisheries.
6 
Table 2 presents descriptive statistics of total wealth and its components.  Our sample includes 
an unbalanced panel of 115 developed and developing countries for years 1995, 2000 and 2005 
(total of 315 observations). All the numbers in Table 2 are expressed in per capita terms in 
constant 2005 US$. For most countries in our sample, intangible capital is the largest component 
of total wealth; on average it constitutes 64 percent of total wealth, although it varies from a 
minimum of 5 percent in Uganda to a maximum of 90 percent in St. Lucia. Figure 2a shows that 
intangible capital is positively correlated with income. This is not surprising. As shown in Panel 
B of Table 2, except for net foreign assets, richer countries have, on average, more capital than 
                                                                                                                                                                                                 
rate, the expression for total wealth can be simplified to  ds e t C W
t s
t
) ( ) (
  
 
 , where ρ, the pure rate of time 
preference, is assumed to equal 1.5 percent. For more details please see World Bank (forthcoming). 
5 An indicator of financial integration used by Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2007), the sum of external assets and 
liabilities over GDP, has risen steadily in both developing and developed countries, more markedly in the latter, 
where it increased by a factor of 7, from 45% in 1970 to over 300% in 2004, with a clear acceleration in the mid 
1990s.  
6 Owing to data limitations no explicit value for ecosystem services is estimated. However, the services provided by 
ecosystems, such as the hydrological functions of forests and the pollination services of insects and birds, are 
indirectly captured in the natural wealth estimates through the values of cropland and pastureland. 6 
 
poorer countries for each capital category.
7 The share of intangible capital in total wealth is also 
positively correlated with income, as shown in Figure 2b. For the OECD countries, this share is 
on average 78 percent and always larger than 60 percent. Panel B in Table 2 also shows IC 
increasing over time, in absolute value and as a percentage of total wealth. The z-statistic for a 
test of a difference between the means in the IC shares in years 2005 and 1995 is 1.12. 
2.2 Human capital  
The analysis in World Bank (2006) suggests that the value of the stock of human capital is a 
large component of a country's wealth. This fits well with the intuition that an important asset of 
a country is its people. Not surprisingly, the statistical agencies in some developed countries are 
starting to systematically compile human capital accounts to monitor the evolution of the stock 
of human capital. A method typically employed to value the stock of human capital in dollars is 
the lifetime income approach of Jorgenson and Fraumeni (1989, 1992a, 1992b). Under this 
approach, human capital is valued as the net present value of the income flow it produces over an 
assumed lifetime.  In practice, the application of the method requires information on survival, 
enrollment and employment probabilities as well as earnings, by sex, age and educational 
attainment. Although these are relatively modest informational requirements, applying this 
method to a cross section of countries is impracticable.  
Most of the empirical studies studying the role of human capital on growth and development 
accounting have focused instead on a cost-based approach to measure human capital. In order to 
increase future labor productivity and future income, people forgo consumption and invest in 
education.  The human capital embodied in the labor force can then be seen as a function of 
education. Even accepting education as a valid proxy for investment in human capital, the 
relationship between education and human capital needs to be correctly specified.
8 The current 
consensus relies on a log-linear specification between earnings and years of schooling first 
formulated by Mincer (1974), to express the human capital per worker as an exponential function 
of the years of schooling, 
) (N e h
  , where the function  ) (N  represents the efficiency of a unit of 
labor with N years of schooling relative to one with no schooling (for reviews see Krueger and 
Lindahl, 2001; Woessman, 2003). We follow common practice and use  N r N e  ) (  , where re is 
the rate of return to education. 
We made different assumptions regarding the returns to education. Our benchmark is re=8.5 
percent return on years of schooling as in Arrow et al. (2010) and Klenow and Rodriguez-Clare 
                                                            
7 This is also true for aggregate natural resource stocks; the simple correlation between GNI per capita and the 
natural resource stock per capita for the countries in our sample is 0.44. 
8 For example, Klenow and Rodriguez-Clare (1997) show that using secondary school enrolment rates as proxies for 
human capital in Mankiw, Romer and Weil (1992) exaggerates the role of human capital in explaining differences in 
output per worker, as secondary enrolment varies more than other (preferable) measures of human capital. The 
results of Mankiw Romer and Weil (1992) are not robust to expanding the human capital estimator to include 
primary and terciary education or to using an alternative human capital estimator based on Mincerian regressions.   7 
 
(1997, 2005) -this is the average of returns to education in Psacharopoulos and Patrinos (2004). 
The results did not change when we adjusted the returns to education to account for differences 
in educational quality across countries. In this case,   QN r N e  ) (  , where Q is a country-specific 
educational quality index, as in Hanushek and Kimko (2000).
9   
We also used two alternative data sources for years of schooling, s, as an indicator of the level of 
educational attainment in the labor force: Barro and Lee (2001) and Cohen and Soto (2007).
10  In 
this paper we present the results for the human capital indicator based on Barro and Lee's years 
of schooling. This reduces our sample to 112 countries and 309 observations. When the human 
capital indicator was based in Cohen and Soto's N, the estimates were robust, if a bit less precise, 
but the sample size further dropped, by 20 percent (from 112 to 88 countries, or from 309 to 253 
observations).  
Finally, we augment our indicator of human capital to account for the health of the population 
and of the working force; 
) (N
he A h
     (3) 




  as in Caselli  (2005), where ASR is the adult survival rate.  
Shastry and Weil (2003) argue that differences in health status proxied by adult mortality rates 
map into substantial differences in energy and capacity for effort.  Caselli (2005) finds that 
correcting the standard human capital measures to account for health, proxied, as in our case, by 
adult survival rates (ASR), increases the percentage of cross-country income variance attributed 
to physical and human capital by almost one third.  In Weil (2007) accounting for health 
differences reduces the variance of log GDP per worker by 9.9 percent.  
                                                            
9 Hanushek and Kimko (2000) combine the results of cognitive achievement tests in mathematics and science into 
two educational quality indexes.  We take an average of the two indexes and, as Woessman (2003), normalize the 
educational quality index for each country relative to the US. Woessman argues that the US is a good reference 
country as the returns to schooling should be relatively undistorted in the competitive US labor market. Data are 
available for 80 countries in our sample. 
10 From both data sets we take the years of schooling in the population aged 15 and over because this age group 
corresponds better to the labor force for most developing countries (the majority in our sample) than the population 
aged 25 and over (Woessman 2003, p.256). The Barro and Lee dataset contains the average years of schooling in 5-
year intervals from 1960 to 1995 and projections for 2000. Values for 2005 were predicted by using a linear trend 
fitted from the observations between 1960 and 2000. When a country-specific growth rate in the years of schooling 
could not be calculated, the regional average growth rate was used. A visual inspection of the data suggests that a 
linear trend is a good approximation. A caveat, however, is that educational attainment is asymptotically a constant, 
and by fitting a linear trend we may overstate the educational attainment for the countries that have reached the 
asymptote. This would affect mainly OECD countries.  Our second source for schooling data (Cohen and Soto, 
2007) suggests that this may not be a problem. Virtually all the developed countries with the exception of Norway 
and Sweden exhibit more years of schooling in this second dataset for all the years considered, including 2005. For 
Norway and Sweden, the largest difference between the two datasets is 0.52 years of schooling. Cohen and Soto 
(2007) report educational attainment for the years 1990, 2000, and a projection for 2010. Since we are interested in 
the years 1995 and 2005, averages of 1990 and 2000 values were taken for 1995 and of 2000 and 2010 for 2005. 8 
 
Adult survival rates are available in consistent form for a large cross-section of countries from 
the WDI.
11  The ASR has the advantage of measuring survival during working years (15-60), and 
thus seems likely to be a good measure of health during working years, which is what should be 
most relevant for determining the level of output per worker (Weil 2007). Weil (2007) estimates 
a value of ASR  =0.653.  
Table 2 reports descriptive statistics for years of schooling and human capital for all the 
countries in the sample (Panel A) and subsamples according to level of economic development 
and year (Panel B). Notice that while other capital assets in Table 2 are expressed in dollars, 
human capital is the 'physical' human capital embodied in a worker as expressed in (3). 
2.3 Institutional capital 
As in World Bank (2006) our indicator for institutional capital is a rule of law index from 
Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi (2009).  It measures the extent to which agents have confidence 
in and abide by the rules of society. In particular, it measures the quality of contract enforcement, 
property rights, the police, and the courts, as well as the likelihood of crime and violence.
12  
In their Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) research project, Kaufmann, Kraay and 
Mastruzzi, provide data on five additional dimensions of governance: voice and accountability, 
political stability and absence of violence, government effectiveness, regulatory quality and 
control of corruption. These indicators are highly correlated -the lowest pair-wise correlation 
coefficient in our sample is 0.76 between political stability and regulatory quality. 
An argument employed in World Bank (2006) to use the rule of law indicator, is that it captures 
well some of the features of a country's social capital, in particular trust. The correlation between 
a generalized trust indicator in Paldam and Svendsen (2006) and rule of law, 0.51, is larger than 
for other indicators of governance.  
As an alternative, we averaged the six governance indicators. Many previous studies have 
averaged or summed governance indicators, with the rationale being that averaging reduces 
measurement error if the indicators pertain to similar underlying concepts of governance and 
have independent errors (e.g. Wheeler and Mody, 1992; Mauro, 1995; Chong and Calderon, 
2000). In Section 4 we report results for the rule of law index but the results were robust to the 
use of an aggregate indicator. 
 
                                                            
11 Adult mortality rates (AMR) are calculated as the weighted average of male and female adult mortality rates 
(series SP.DYN.AMRT.MA and SP.DYN.AMRT.FE, respectively) available from the WDI (2008). For Australia, 
Canada, Germany, Italy and the US, 2005 rates are missing so 2004 values are used instead. ASR=1-AMR. 
12 In the original dataset, the rule of law index ranges between -2.69 and 2.12; we rescaled it between 1 and 100. 9 
 
3. Bridging the development accounting and wealth accounting literatures 
There is an obvious parallel between our finding of a large intangible wealth residual and the 
finding in the growth and development accounting literatures that a residual, TFP, accounts for 
more than 50 percent of the variation in income per capita.  
Development accounting tries to identify the basic determinants of income levels. Conceptually, 
it can be thought of as quantifying the contributions of factor inputs and productivity to 
economic performance:  
Y=F(Factors, Productivity). 
More specifically, development accounting calculates the relative contributions of measurable 
input quantities –physical and human capital- and the total factor productivity (TFP) residual in 
explaining cross-country differences in income levels.   
In performing a development accounting exercise, the starting point is a Cobb-Douglas 
production function, in which we include natural resources, S, as a factor of production, in 
addition to physical capital, K, and human capital (H=hL). If we assume Hicks-neutral 
productivity, total output can be expressed as: 
) 1 ( ) (
       hL S AK Y , (4) 
and output per worker,  L Y y /  ,  as: 
) 1 (        h s Ak y    (5) 
where  L S s /  is the natural resources to labor ratio,  L K k /  is the physical capital to labor 
ratio, h is the 'physical' human capital per worker, and L is the number of workers.  
3.1 Explaining variation in output per worker with factors of production 
The typical question in the literature is how much of the variation in y can be explained by 
variation in the observables k, s and h, and how much is attributed to differences in A. As in 
Caselli (2005), if we define
) 1 (        h s k y factors , we can rewrite (5) as  
factors Ay y  .   (6) 
We can measure the "success" of the factors-only model at explaining cross-country income 
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The first expression, assumes that all the countries have the same level of TFP, so that A is a 
constant. The second expression, proposed by Klenow and Rodriguez-Clare (1997), allows 
countries to have different levels of efficiency, and splits the contribution from the covariance 
term evenly between A and yfactors.  
We have data on k, s, and h.
13 We use the WDI GNI series to compute output per worker. For the 
factor shares, most of the previous empirical studies take α=1/3 and ignore natural resources as a 
factor of production (i.e. β=0). A notable exception is the study of Tzouvelekas, Vouvaki and 
Xepapadeas (2007). They introduce the environment, proxied by CO2 emissions, into their 
computations of TFP. The implicit shares of the environment in output in their analysis can be as 
high as 14%.  For our analysis we take a more conservative value of β=10%, but the results in 
Table 3 are robust to taking β=0.  
The first column of Table 3 shows the results of the estimation of the two measures of success, 
and their components.  The fraction of the variance of income explained by observed 
endowments (k,s, h) is 0.20 if we use the first standard measure of success, and 0.43 if we use 
Klenow and Rodriguez-Clare's. The Klenow and Rodriguez-Clare measure assigns a greater role 
to factors of production, but their contribution is still under 50 percent.  
Compare equation (5), with equation (7): 
) 1 (        ic s Ak y    (7) 
Equation (5), even including natural resources, is more or less conventional. Only produced, 
natural and human capital are represented in the equation, so that the TFP factor A picks up the 
contribution to income of all ‘missing’ assets. 
For equation (7) we have included intangible wealth as the third production factor. If  ic actually 
is measuring a wide range of assets (human, social, institutional, etc.), then the contribution of A 
to explaining the variation of output per worker should be small – zero in the limit. 
So one way to bring together the wealth accounting and growth accounting literatures would be 
to estimate the two success indicators and examine the estimated contributions of yfactors, (with ic 
instead of h), and A to see if the contribution of A is indeed small. The second column of Table 3 
shows that to be case. When ic is the third factor of production instead of h, both measures of 
success of the factors-only model are 97 percent.
14 
                                                            
13 We take the estimates of total physical capital and natural capital wealth and divide them by the labor force series, 
(SL.TLF.TOTL.IN), to obtain estimates of k and s. 
14 We repeated the calculations in Table 3 for each of the years, 1995, 2000, and 2005, independently, and for the 
subsamples of OECD and non-OECD countries. The results, not reported, are available from the authors. The 
relative contributions of A and yfactors are constant over time and similar to those in Table 3. The differences between 
OECD and non-OECD countries are minimal when factors of production are conventionally defined, but if ic is used 11 
 
These measures of success are certainly large, but it must be recalled that intangible capital 
includes, by construction, all missing factors of production. The result therefore makes sense. By 
comparison, the traditional development accounting literature invokes TFP as the factor which 
explains all of the residual variation in output across countries after capital and labor factors have 
been taken into account.  
3.2. Explaining output per worker         
By taking logarithms of (5), we obtain: 
) ln( ) 1 ( ) ln( ) ln( ) ln( ) ln( h s k A y           .       (8) 
In the tradition of the development accounting literature, equation (8) can be estimated 
econometrically. 
it it h it s it k t i it h s k y             ) ln( ) ln( ) ln( ) ln( .      (9) 
The parameters  k  ,  s  and  h  represent the contributions of physical capital, natural capital and 
human capital to aggregate productivity, gamma allows for differences in total factor 
productivity across countries and lambda for differences in TFP over time. Notice that unlike the 
approach in the previous section, equation (9) treats  k  ,  s  and  h  as free parameters, which adds 
a layer of testability to the theory. Equation (9) is similar to equation (7) in Topel (1999).  
We estimate (9) using country and time fixed effects. Thus, we do not need to assume that 
capital intensities are orthogonal to productivity differences across countries or over time. A 
widespread criticism to the estimation of (9) with cross-section data (as is done in Mankiw, 
Romer and Weil, 1992) is that if more productive (higher A) countries are also more intense 
users of capital, the causal contribution of observed inputs will be overstated. By using country-
specific fixed effects, we avoid this potential bias.  
Tzouvelekas, Vouvaki and Xepapadeas (2007) also estimate a function similar to (9). They note 
that an additional problem when estimating a production function is the potential endogeneity of 
the inputs which results in inconsistent estimators. However, they also note that, as shown by 
Mundlak (1996), under constant returns to scale, OLS estimates of a k-input Cobb-Douglas 
production function in average productivity form, with regressors in input-labor ratio form (as 
we have in equation 9), are consistent. 
The estimated elasticities from the estimation of equation (9) are reported in the first column of 
Table 4. The share of physical capital is 0.4 and statistically significant. However, the shares for 
                                                                                                                                                                                                 
instead of human capital, the measures of success are larger in non-OECD countries than in OECD countries (0.94 
and 0.82, respectively, for SuccessC). 
 12 
 
human capital and natural resources are not statistically significant. In column (2) of Table 4, we 
use intangible capital as the third factor of production instead of human capital. The estimate for 
the share of physical capital, 0.32, is similar to that reported in Tzouvelekas, Vouvaki and 
Xepapadeas (2007).  Our estimate for the share of natural capital, 0.07, is larger than theirs 
(0.04).  An explanation could be that their indicator of natural capital, which only refers to CO2 
emissions, is narrower than ours. Finally, our estimated share of intangible capital, 0.18, is also 
larger than their estimated share for human capital, 0.07. This is what we would expect. Our 
intangible capital variable is broader and arguably encompasses their indicator of human capital.   
The results in column (2) seem to be driven by non-OECD countries. In column (3) we report 
estimates for the subsample of non-OECD countries. The results are similar to those in column 
(2) for the whole sample. The results for the subsample of OECD countries, reported in column 
(4), are strikingly different. The share of physical capital is 0.21 and statistically insignificant, 
suggesting that physical capital plays a smaller role than in non-OECD countries, while the share 
of intangible capital increases to 0.5. The estimated share of natural capital is reduced and is 
statistically insignificant. These results are consistent with the poor performance of savings 
measures that exclude human capital (or other intangible assets) accumulation in OECD 
countries reported in Ferreira and Vincent (2005). 
4. Investigating the composition of intangible capital 
The previous section suggests that intangible capital is indeed measuring a wide range of assets: 
human capital and other forms of intangible capital grouped under the heading of total factor 
productivity.  In this section, we estimate the relationship between intangible capital and our 
proxies of human and institutional capital econometrically to analyze their relative contributions. 
We assume that  
ic=f(h, g),   (10) 
where ic is intangible capital per capita, h is our indicator of 'physical' human capital per worker, 
and g is an indicator of institutional capital (a rule of law index).   
Compared to World Bank (2006), we do not consider foreign remittances. Workers' remittances 
received by a country represent compensation to its human capital residing abroad, but they are a 
flow (yearly payments) rather than a stock.
15   
By definition, intangible wealth is the sum of sources of wealth other than physical and natural 
capital. We thus estimate a linear specification,  
                                                            
15 It could be argued that even though they are a flow, remittances are correlated with the stock of human capital of a 
country. We repeated all the regressions including remittances per capita as an additional explanatory variable and 
the results we report below did not change; remittances were not significant in any specification and the coefficients 
on the other variables were robust to its inclusion. 13 
 
it it it t i it g h ic            ,  (11) 
in which   is the price of a unit of h, γ is the price of one point in the rule of law index, g,  i   is 
a country-specific intercept and  t   is a time dummy for t=2000 and 2005. We also estimated the 
relationship in (10) using a log linear model, and a log-log model, but (11) was our preferred 
specification. 
4.1 Econometric issues with the estimation of equation (11) 
Intangible capital is, by definition, a broad concept, and our specification in (11) is very 
parsimonious with only two regressors, h and g.  If h and g are correlated with the regression 
error term, then our estimators would be inconsistent. This potential correlation between 
regressors and error term can stem from various sources including omitted variables, errors in 
variables (measurement errors in the regressors) and simultaneous causality. 
In order to deal with the first issue, omitted variable bias, we introduce (country- and time-) fixed 
effects in the regression. The combined time and country fixed effects regression model 
eliminates omitted variable bias arising from both unobserved variables that are constant over 
time, and from unobserved variables that are constant across countries. The country dummies 
( i  ) capture time-invariant country-specific traits while the time dummies ( t  ) capture common 
shocks to the intangible capital across countries.  
Measurement error, on the other hand, typically results in attenuation bias, so, provided this were 
the only source of correlation, we can interpret our coefficients for h and g as lower-bound 
estimates of their true effects.  
The third source of correlation, simultaneous causality, is causality running from our dependent 
variable, intangible capital, to h and g as well as from h and g to intangible capital. An advantage 
of our analysis is that intangible capital, by construction, is forward looking. Total wealth is 
calculated as the present discounted value of future consumption flows (see Section 2.1 for 
details on its derivation) and by definition cannot determine past educational and institutional 
outcomes.  
The discussion above should go some way to allaying endogeneity concerns.  Alternatively, we 
could use instrumental variables (IV). In practice, finding good instruments, i.e. exogenous 
sources of variation that affect intangible capital only through their effect on h and g and not 
directly, is difficult.  
Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2001) use differences in European settler mortality rates as 
an instrument for current institutions. We can use this variable as an instrument for the rule of 
law index, but we need at least an additional instrument for human capital.  Hall and Jones 14 
 
(1999) propose using the geographical and linguistic characteristics of an economy as 
instrumental variables for their social infrastructure. We focused on distance from the equator 
and the percentage of the population speaking a Western European language as their first 
language today.  
Another problem with the IV strategy is that it limits the analysis to a cross-section as the 
instrumental variables are available only at a point in time. We chose the year 1995 since the 
data for years of schooling for 1995 are arguable measured with less error than for 2000 and 
2005, where extrapolations were used.  The first instrumental variable, logarithm of settler 
mortality rates, further limits the analysis to 59 countries that are ex-colonies. Thus, the results 
from the IV analysis should be interpreted with caution and considered only tentative. 
4.2 Panel estimation results 
Table 5 shows the results from the estimation of equation (11).  The columns differ in terms of 
the estimation technique and the variable measuring human capital per worker. For column (1) 
we replicate the results in World Bank (2006); that is, we just pool the observations over the 
years 1995, 2000, and 2005 and use OLS so that  i i     and  t t   0  .  The indicator of 
human capital is simply years of schooling from Barro and Lee (2001).  In column (2) we also 
use OLS on the pooled sample, but the indicator of human capital is given by equation (3). Both 
the coefficients on our indicator of institutional quality and years of schooling exhibit positive 
signs and are highly significant. An additional point in the rule of law index is associated with an 
increase in intangible wealth per capita of around $3,000. An additional year of schooling is 
associated with an increase in intangible wealth per capita of over $11,000 and a unit increase in 
human capital per worker with an increase in intangible wealth per capita of around $45,000.  
The regressions in columns (1) and (2) also include income dummies relative to high income 
countries.  All of them are negative and statistically significant.  This means that countries in 
each income group have a lower level of intangible capital than high income countries which is 
consistent with the positive relationship between income and intangible capital shown in Figure 
2. The coefficients are large in magnitude; around $100,000 for all income categories. 
In columns (3) and (4) we introduce country fixed effects in the model.  The null hypothesis of 
country-specific intercepts equal to zero is rejected for both regressions. Compared to columns 
(1) and (2) the coefficients on rule of law are reduced and, although still positive, they are no 
longer statistically significant. The estimated coefficients of human capital in both columns 
increase in size and remain highly significant. Note that of the three components of h in (3)–years 
of schooling, returns to education and adult survival rates, returns to education does not vary 
over time or across countries. Thus, estimation of (11) using country fixed effects relies on the 
within-country variation of years of schooling and adult survival rates.  15 
 
In columns (5) and (6), we introduce time fixed-effects in addition to country fixed effects in the 
regression, as we also reject the joint null hypothesis that the time dummies are equal to zero, in 
this case at a 2 percent significance level or better.  This is our preferred specification, since, as 
discussed, time and country fixed effects address omitted variable bias arising from both 
unobserved variables that are constant over time, and from unobserved variables that are constant 
across countries. Compared to column (3), in column (5) years of schooling becomes 
insignificant, suggesting that the time dummies capture the variation of years of schooling over 
time. This is not surprising; a linear trend fits years of schooling well for most countries (see 
footnote 8). h, which accounts for adult survival rates, remains significant when we include both 
types of fixed effects.  
The estimated coefficient on human capital in column (6) is large; a one-point increase in the 
human capital indicator is associated with an increase in intangible wealth of over $92,000. This 
implies a difference of intangible wealth of over $320,000 per capita between the country with 
the lowest human capital (Mozambique with an average value of 1.54 over the sample period) 
and the country with the highest human capital (Norway with an average value of 5.08). Finally, 
the estimates for the time dummies are positive and statistically significant indicating that 
intangible capital per capita has increased over time, as shown in Table 2 Panel B. 
The results in Table 5 are robust to a number of changes. First, we repeated the regressions using 
alternative measures of human capital. In particular, we considered an indicator that accounted 
for differences in the quality of schooling across countries (see footnote 7). We also repeated the 
regressions with human capital measures based on Cohen and Soto's (2007) years of schooling. 
Second, we used an average index of governance instead of the rule of law index as indicator of 
institutional capital. Third, we excluded outliers and influential observations as identified by 
Cook's distance. Fourth, we introduced interaction terms between the indicator of institutional 
capital and human capital.  
We used the estimates in column (6) to compare actual intangible capital with the in-sample 
predictions from the model. Results of the calculations are available upon request. The positive 
and large contributions to intangible wealth from human capital and from common shocks to all 
the countries (from the time dummy coefficients) contrasted with the negative (and statistically 
significant for non-OECD countries) country-specific intercepts. 
4.3 IV estimation results 
Table 6 reports the results of the IV analysis. The first panel in Table 6 shows the association 
between the three instruments (log of settler mortality rates, distance from the equator and 
fraction of a country's population whose first language is Western European) and the two 
independent variables, h and g. Distance from the equator and the percentage of the population 
whose first language is a Western European language have the expected positive signs in both 16 
 
regressions and are highly statistically significant in the human capital regression. Settler 
mortality rate has the expected negative sign and is statistically significant at a 1 percent level in 
both regressions. Overall, the instruments are strongly associated with the rule of law and human 
capital variables. Together the three instruments explain approximately 52 percent of the 
variation in our institutions variable and 62 percent of the variation in our human capital 
variable.  
A second desirable property in the instruments is that they affect the dependent variable, in our 
case, intangible capital, only through their impact on the rule of law index and human capital; i.e. 
the instruments are not correlated with the error term in the equation explaining intangible 
capital. By employing three instruments, we can test this assumption.
16 Panel B in Table 6 
reports the results from two tests, the Sargan and Basman tests. In both cases we cannot reject 
the null that the instruments are exogenous. 
Both rule of law and human capital have positive coefficients in the second stage regressions in 
Panel C Table 6. For rule of law, its magnitude, around $2,300, is similar to that in the OLS 
regressions in Table 5, while for human capital, at around $80,000, it is between the OLS and 
fixed effect estimates in Table 5. They are estimated less precisely, however, and neither is 
statistically significant at conventional levels; human capital is significant at a 32 percent 
significance level.  
 
5. Conclusions 
For most countries the sources of wealth reported in the standard system of national accounts 
(SNA) are just a small percentage of their comprehensive wealth.  Based on economic theory, in 
this paper we use a measure of comprehensive wealth computed as the present discounted value 
of future consumption to analyze what conventional accounting systems are leaving out. Our 
estimates of comprehensive wealth are on the order of 20 times net national income; the implicit 
rate of return on comprehensive wealth for 80 percent of the countries in our sample lies between 
4 and 6 percent.  
 
We calculate intangible capital as a residual, by subtracting the values of assets that the SNA 
measures (produced capital and net financial assets), and estimates of the value of the stock of 
natural capital, from the value of comprehensive wealth. For most of the countries in our sample, 
                                                            
16 This assumption, known as the exclusion restriction, is not testable in exactly identified models (i.e. models in 
which the number of instruments is equal to the number of endogenous covariates).  If the model is overidentified 
(so that there are more instruments than endogenous covariates, as in our case with 3 instruments and 2 endogenous 
covariates), there is information available which may be used to test this assumption.  
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and especially for OECD countries, intangible capital is the largest constituent of total wealth. 
For the whole sample, it represents on average more than 60 percent of total wealth. 
 
Our measure of intangible capital therefore captures a broad range of assets – not only human 
capital, but also social/institutional and other forms of capital. Intuitively, we would expect 
intangible capital to be related to total factor productivity (TFP), and part of the analysis in this 
paper is concerned with verifying this intuition. Using a development accounting framework, we 
applied variance decomposition techniques to measure the extent to which factors of production 
explain the variation in output per worker.  When the factors of production are physical capital, 
natural capital, and (physical) human capital per worker, they explain only between 20 and 43 
percent of the total variation in output per worker in our sample – the balance of the variation is 
assumed to be explained by TFP. When the factors of production are physical capital, natural 
capital, and the intangible capital residual (instead of human capital), the variation in factors of 
production explains 97 percent of the total variation in output per worker – the balance of the 
variation explained by TFP must therefore be extremely small. 
 
There is strong evidence, therefore, for a link between the non-human capital portion of 
intangible capital and TFP. This is important given the emphasis given to TFP growth, versus 
increases in factor inputs, in the growth literature. Ultimately, growth in factor inputs will be 
subject to diminishing returns. But this can be overcome through growth in TFP, which 
economists have generally equated with knowledge – more efficient technologies, more effective 
management, and increased quality of institutions. Our analysis suggests that wealth accounting 
can begin to put an asset value on this knowledge. 
 
To better understand the role played by intangible capital in production, we also estimated a 
Cobb-Douglas production function where produced, natural and intangible capital are the factors 
of production. Using fixed effects estimation for all countries in our sample (115 countries over 
the years 1995, 2000 and 2005), we find that the shares of produced, natural and intangible 
capital in production are 32%, 7% and 18% respectively; if we limit our sample to developing 
countries the shares are quite similar. However, when we limit the sample to OECD countries, 
we find the striking result that the only statistically significant factor of production is intangible 
capital, with a 50% share. This finding supports the conjecture in Ferreira and Vincent (2005) 
that intangible factors, rather than produced or natural capital, are the principal sources of 
consumption growth in high-income countries. 
 
We also attempted to decompose the constituents of intangible capital using data on institutional 
quality (as measured by a rule of law index) and human capital.  Panel regression analysis 
suggests that the contribution of human capital is indeed important. A one-point increase in our 
human capital indicator is associated with an increase in intangible wealth of over $92,000 for 
the average country in our sample. This implies a difference in intangible capital of over 18 
 
$320,000 per capita between the country with the lowest human capital (Mozambique with an 
average value of 1.54 over the sample period) and the country with the highest human capital 
(Norway with an average value of 5.08).  In contrast, we find that the rule of law index is not a 
significant contributor to intangible capital. When we decompose the predicted levels of 
intangible capital using our estimated model we observe large negative (and statistically 
significant) fixed effects for all developing countries. It is certainly conceivable that the quality 
of institutions, captured only imperfectly with our rule of law index, and the legacy of geography 
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Table 1: National wealth and income in Canada, 2009 ($bn CDN) 
Net financial assets  -109,452 
Land assets  1,846,753 
Produced capital (K)  4,191,919 
Net worth  5,929,220 
GNI 1,505,817 
Implicit rate of return 
K / GNI  2.78  35.9% 
Net worth / GNI  3.94  25.4% 23 
 
Table 2: Descriptive statistics 
Panel A  Full Sample   
Mean Std.  Dev.  Min  Max   
Total wealth  163,582  215,857 2,152 902,960  
Produced capital  30,625  40,887 132 183,078  
Natural capital   11,925  20,730 2 169,150  
Net foreign assets  -24  12,515 -49,818 74,280  
Intangible capital  121,056  170,061 278 799,123  
Intangible capital/ 
    total wealth  0.64  0.18 0.05 0.90
 
Years of schooling  6.52  2.87 0.76 12.59  
Human capital  3.06  0.91 1.46 5.34  
Rule of law  56.17  23.19 6.96 100.00  
Panel B  OECD 
Non-






Means (standard deviations in parentheses) 
Total wealth  486,177 61,000 157,722  162,365  169,751 
 (183,435)  (84,088)  (204,314)  (213,149)  (229,400) 
Produced capital  90,562  11,566  30,153  30,237  31,410 
 (34,932)  (17,580)  (40,364)  (40,081)  (42,447) 
Natural capital  17,656  10,102  12,050  12,947  10,806 
 (19,540)  (20,805)  (21,709)  (22,212)  (18,360) 
Net foreign assets  -3,469  1,072  273  -165  -135 
 (15,814)  (11,083)  (11,537)  (12,799)  (13,120) 
Intangible capital  381,427  38,260  115,246  119,347  127,669 
 (147,274)  (52,810)  (158,600)  (167,351)  (182,924) 
Intangible capital/  0.78  0.59  0.63  0.63  0.66 
    total wealth  (0.06)  (0.18)  (0.17)  (0.19)  (0.19) 
Years of schooling  9.64 5.53  5.99  6.61  6.88 
 (1.59)  (2.44)  (2.83)  (2.84)  (2.88) 
Human capital  4.14  2.71  2.92  3.08  3.16 
 (0.57)  (0.71)  (0.88)  (0.90)  (0.95) 
Rule of law  86.64  46.48  57.74  56.04  54.96 
 (10.12)  (16.92)  (24.25)  (22.52)  (23.06) 
Notes: Panel A: full sample includes an unbalanced panel of 115 developed and developing countries for years 
1995, 2000 and 2005 (total of 315 observations), except for human capital for which sample is 112 countries and 
309 observations. All variables except years of schooling, human capital and rule of law are expressed in per capita 
terms in constant 2005 US$. Years of schooling in population aged 15 and over from Barro and Lee (2001); human 
capital  ) (s
he A h
   (see text for details); rule of law index (1-100 scale) from Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi 24 
 
(2009). Panel B: repots means with standard deviations in parentheses for subsamples of OECD countries (76 
observations); non-OECD countries (239 observations); year 1995 (94 observations); year 2000 (110 observations); 
year 2005 (111 observations). 
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var (log(y)) 2.80  2.80 
var (log(yfactors)) 0.56  2.71 
cov(log(A), log(yfactors)) 0.65  0.003 
SuccessC   0.20 0.97 
SuccessKR   0.43 0.97 
Notes: sample includes an unbalanced panel of 112 developed and developing countries for years 1995, 2000 and 
2005 (total of 309 observations).  26 
 
Table 4: Development accounting regression; implicit shares  
Implicit shares 
      





(0.073) (0.058)  (0.062)  (0.128) 
ln(s)  -0.022 0.068
** 0.072
* 0.030 
(0.037) (0.033)  (0.039)  (0.037) 
ln(h)  0.356      
(0.348)      




 (0.054)  (0.055)  (0.010) 
      
Country Fixed Effects  Yes Yes  Yes  Yes 
(p-value F.E =0)  (0.00)  (0.00) (0.00)  (0.00) 
Time Fixed Effects   Yes Yes  Yes  Yes 
(p-value F.E =0)  (0.01)  (0.00) (0.00)  (0.00) 
      
Sample  All All  Non-OECD  OECD 
N  311 311  234  76 
n  112 112  86  26 
Notes: Dependent variable is ln(output per worker). Independent variables are ln(capital-labor 
ratio), ln(natural resources-labor ratio), ln(intangible capital-labor ratio), ln(human capital per 
worker) 
***,**, * denote significance at 1% , 5% , and 10 percent levels, respectively. 
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Table 5: Explaining intangible capital 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
        
Rule of law  3,000 2,819 308  37  354  188 
  (434)*** (433)*** (383) (388) (385) (380) 
Years   11,025   36,568   2,480   
   schooling  (2,817)***   (7,877)***   (13,893)   
h   46,178   124,450   92,899 
   (10,280)***   (24,078)***   (27,590)*** 
li  -107,214  -92,272      
  (28,644)*** (29,568)***        
lmi  -153,354 -141,295        
  (22,928)*** (23,375)***        
umi  -163,090 -153,567        
  (18,925)*** (19,352)***        
dy2000      12,954  6,470 
      (4,264)***  (2,337)*** 
dy2005      25,356  10,013 
      (8,588)***  (4,137)** 
Constant  -22,502 -90,246        
  (42,663)  (50,148)*      
        
Country  FE  No No Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
(F-test  p-value)    0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
Time  FE  No No No No Yes  Yes 
(F-test  p-value)      0.01  0.02 
        
Observations  315 309 315 309 315 309 
Number  of  id  115 112 115 112 115 112 
R-squared
a  0.77 0.78 0.21 0.30 0.25 0.31 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. a. 
R-squared in fixed-effects regressions corresponds to within-R-squared. 28 
 
Table 6: IV analysis 
 
Panel A: 1st stage regressions 





Log (settler   -7.75
*** -0.24
***
   mortality)  (2.04) (0.07)
European language   7.11 0.59
***











Panel C: 2nd stage regression 
Intangible capital 
























Source: Author’s calculations, based on data from World Bank (forthcoming). 
Vertical axis is country count, horizontal axis is ranges of rates of return. 
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BDI ZAR MOZ SLE RWA MWI UGA NER GNB NPL GMB MLI BGD TGO ZWE GHA BEN IND ZMB KEN HTI MRT SEN PAK NIC CHN CMR LKA BOL PNG LSO EGY PHL HND IDN SYR JOR TUN DOM
IRN THA ECU PER GTM SLV DZA SWZ
COL FJI BWA

































BDI SLE LBR RWA GNB TJK MOZ MWI NER UGA GMB NPL MLI ZWE TGO BGD GHA BEN ZMB KEN MDA SDN HTI IND MRT PAK SEN NIC LSO CMR BOL LKA IDN HND CHN PHL EGY SYR
JOR
ECU THA SWZ TUN SLV PER GTM DZA BGR COL DOM VCT DMA JAM ROM
FJI RUS







































ZAR LBR GNB SLE MWI RWA NER ZWE GMB UGA NPL MOZ CAF TGO TJK MLI BGD GHA BEN HTI KEN ZMB MRT VNM SDN PAK SEN IND MDA NIC LSO BOL CMR HND LKA EGY IDN PHL SYR CHN SWZ
SLV JOR
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Figure 2b: Share of intangible capital in total wealth is positively correlated with income 